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Abstract
This paper analyses comparative statics for first price auctions and all pay
auctions with independent private values. In all pay auctions, bidders with low
values will respond to a stochastically higher (in the sense of likelihood ratio
dominance) distribution of types by playing less aggressively while high value
bidders bid more. In the first price auction, a similar change results in all types
playing more aggressively. Furthermore, we show that a decrease in dispersion of
values, in the sense of a refinement of second order stochastic dominance, although
also associated with an increase in competitiveness, may in addition result in
less aggressive play by bidders with high values in both auction forms. We also
find similar considerations in an oligopoly game with incomplete information:
stochastically lower costs can lead to higher prices.
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1 Introduction
Stochastic dominance relationships are essential to comparative statics in games of in-
complete information, such as auctions. However, even a strong ordering of two random
variables - first order stochastic dominance - can be insuﬃcient to ensure unambiguous
comparisons in some auctions (see, for example, Maskin and Riley, 2000a, footnote 14).
As a consequence, several strengthenings of first order stochastic dominance have been
introduced, including the monotone likelihood ratio order used for a wide class of exam-
ples (Athey, 2002) and the monotone probability ratio order (also known as conditional
stochastic dominance or the reverse hazard rate order) used in auctions (Lebrun, 1998;
Maskin and Riley, 2000a). These orderings of distributions allow comparative statics
in games of incomplete information involving changes in distributions of general rather
than specific functional form.
In this paper, we focus on the first price and the all pay auctions.1 We assume
independent private values but allow for risk aversion. For these auctions, we extend
the comparative statics analysis based on likelihood ratio orders in two ways. First, we
show that the standard first price auction and the all pay formats have qualitatively
diﬀerent comparative statics predictions. Specifically, there is a diﬀerence in response
by low value bidders to a change in the distribution of types in the sense of a strong
refinement of first order stochastic dominance. In the first price auction, even low
types are motivated, so that a stochastically higher distribution of types leads to more
aggressive bidding by all. On the contrary, in all pay auctions low-value bidders are
discouraged, so that in the more competitive environment they compete less hard.
Further, we show that the same considerations exist in oligopoly in that a stochastically
lower distribution of costs can lead some firms to charge higher prices.
Second, while being powerful analytical tools, monotone orderings are very restric-
tive, ruling out many interesting cases. Being refinements on first order stochastic
dominance, they oﬀer no predictions for changes in the distributions that satisfy second
order but not first order dominance. Informally speaking, this involves transforma-
tions leading to valuations (or signals, etc.) being “less dispersed” but not necessarily
“higher” than before. There has been little work on the comparative statics arising
from a change in distributions in terms of dispersion. For example, in auctions incom-
plete information simply means that there is some uncertainty about the values held
by other bidders. What happens if there is a decrease in the level of uncertainty? With
this question in mind, we employ a refinement of second order stochastic dominance
based on the unimodality of the likelihood ratio, introduced by Ramos, Ollero and
Sordo (2000). Intuitively, one would expect that such decrease in dispersion of types
would lead to uniformly more aggressive play. We show that in first price auctions, a
reduction in dispersion in the sense of this ordering prompts most types to bid more
1The established convention is to refer to the winner pays first price auction as the “first price
auction”, and the all pay first price auction as the “all pay auction”. We use this terminology as it
is more familiar to most readers, even though it is not completely satisfactory as there also exists a
second price all pay auction (see Krishna and Morgan (1997)).
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aggressively, but the highest types may bid less, resulting in a possible “cross” of bid-
ding functions. Along similar lines, in all pay auctions there can be a “double-cross” of
bidding functions with both low and high types bidding less.
For all pay auction, the reduction in bids caused by an increase in competition can
be explained in the following way. Think of a runner about to compete in a race who
learns that some of the slower competitors will be replaced with faster ones. Clearly,
there would be increased competition for first place amongst fast runners. However,
with a faster field of competitors, slower runners would see an even lower prospect of
winning and reduce costly eﬀort and run slower.2 Analogously, in the all pay auction,
those with high values will bid more in a more competitive environment, while low value
bidders will bid less. In contrast, in a standard first price auction, low value bidders do
not face the same disincentive eﬀect. This is simply because one only pays if one wins,
thus the cost of raising one’s bid is oﬀset by the lower probability of having to pay it.
Existing work on comparative statics for auctions by Lebrun (1998) and Maskin and
Riley (2000a), and, for a wider class of examples, by Athey (2002) has concentrated
on the conditions under which a stochastically higher distribution of valuations should
lead to uniformly more aggressive bidding. Here, we extend this type of result in two
ways. First, we show that such a monotone shift in types is not in fact suﬃcient for
monotone comparative statics in all pay auctions. Further, there are plausible models
of oligopoly where a stochastically lower distribution of costs will lead some firms to
charge higher prices. This is not to say, however, that there are no meaningful results.
Rather for all pay auctions, we make precise predictions about which classes of agents
will adopt higher strategies and which lower. To our knowledge, this is the first work
to identify the discouragement eﬀect under which weak competitors optimally respond
to greater competition by competing less hard.
Second, we allow for a diﬀerent type of change in the distribution of types which
potentially has a number of applications. What happens if the distribution of types
becomes less dispersed? For a private value auction, this would mean that the group of
bidders becomes more homogenous. The obvious hypothesis is that bidding will be more
competitive. This hypothesis that more precise information should lead to uniformly
more aggressive bidding and higher selling prices has been investigated in the context
of common values by Kagel and Levin (1986) and in subsequent literature for specific
functional forms of preferences and distributions of signals. More recently, Goeree and
Oﬀerman (2003) investigated the eﬀects of more precise information on the competitive
bidding in a framework that nests both private and common value cases. Yet, the major
drawback of this literature is that providing agents with “more precise information”
has been frequently analyzed by considering two uniform distributions with diﬀerent
support. While being analytically convenient, this assumption is restrictive. We show
that the unimodal ratio orderings could serve as an alternative technique allowing to
analyze more general pairs of distributions. We show that in general a reduction in
2See Fershtman and Gneezy (2005) for some experimental evidence that increased competition can
lead weak competitors to quit.
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dispersion does not lead to uniformly more aggressive bidding, even under quite strong
regularity conditions. That is, there are plausible circumstances in which more precise
information will induce some agents to bid less. Again, we characterise which agents
these will be, even though, unfortunately, there is little one can say about the average
bid (and thus about revenue comparisons).
It is worth remembering that measures of stochastic dominance are not confined
to the economics of information. Since the famous work of Atkinson (1970) they have
also been important in the literature on social welfare and the comparisons of income
distributions (see Lambert (1989) for a survey). However, the ordering more commonly
used in this literature is (generalized) Lorenz dominance, even though it is equivalent
to second order stochastic dominance (Thistle, 1989), and, thus, both measures can
be interpreted in terms of inequality. More recently, income inequality and games of
incomplete information have been considered together (Hopkins and Kornienko, 2004;
Samuelson, 2004; Hoppe, Moldovanu and Sela, 2005) in the context of strategic social
interaction, where the question has been whether increasing equality leads to greater
social competition. It is hoped that this paper will be of some interest to researchers in
both fields as well as in their intersection.
2 Ordering Distributions in Terms of Dispersion
Ordering distributions in terms of stochastic dominance is now a common tool in the
economics of information. However, the concentration up to now has been on first order
stochastic dominance and its refinements. Clearly, those working on income distribu-
tions, since the seminal work by Atkinson (1970), have had greater interest in second
order stochastic dominance (equivalent to the generalized Lorenz order - see Thistle
(1989)), which allows ordering of distributions in terms of dispersion or inequality.
In this section, we outline a refinement of second order stochastic dominance, which,
though introduced in the context of the analysis of income distributions, we will then
go on to use in comparative statics.
In what follows, we consider two distinct non-negative variables X and Y with finite
means µX and µY respectively, having distribution functions F and G, respectively,
with F and G both having support [z, z¯] with 0 ≤ z < z¯. Assume that F and G are
twice continuously diﬀerentiable and the densities f and g are strictly positive on the
corresponding supports. We employ the following definition of unimodality.3
Definition 1 A function f(z) is unimodal around zˆ if f(z) is strictly increasing for
z < zˆ and f(z) is strictly decreasing for z > zˆ.
3This is a slight strengthening of standard definitions of unimodality - for example, by Dharmad-
hikari and Joag-Dev (1988, Chapter 1) and by An (1998). In the first source, a function f(z) is
unimodal if
R z
z f(t)dt is convex on (z, zˆ) and concave on (zˆ, z¯). In the second, the function f(z) has to
satisfy the following: for all δ > 0, the set Dδ = {z ∈ Ω : f(z) ≥ δ} is a convex set in Ω.
3
The following order of distributions was first introduced by Ramos, Ollero and Sordo
(2000).
Definition 2 Two distributions F , G satisfy the Unimodal Likelihood Ratio (ULR)
order and we write F ÂULR G if the likelihood ratio L(z) = f(z)/g(z) is unimodal and
E[X] ≥ E[Y ]. 4
Ramos, Ollero and Sordo (2000) showed that this order implies second order sto-
chastic dominance (equivalently generalised Lorenz dominance).
Proposition 1 [Ramos, Ollero and Sordo (2000), Theorems 2.1 and 2.2.] If F ÂULR G
and E(X) ≥ E(Y ), then F (z) and G(z) cross exactly once at some z˜ on (z, z¯) and F
second-order stochastically dominates G.
If the two distributions have the same means, then the ULR order implies that G
would be a mean preserving spread of F . In simple terms, if F ÂULR G then distribution
F is either stochastically higher than G or, if it is not stochastically higher, then it is
less dispersed.5 Consider a simple example. Suppose G(z) is a uniform distribution so
that its density g(z) is a constant, then L(z) will be unimodal if f(z) is unimodal, that
is, it is less dispersed than g(z). This example is illustrated in Figure 1. It is well-known
(see, for example, Dharmadhikari and Joag-Dev (1988)) that all logconcave functions
are unimodal.6 Thus, as Ramos, Ollero and Sordo (2000) showed, if logL(z) is concave
and µX ≥ µY , then F ÂULR G.
From our definition of unimodality, there is a unique value of z which we denote
zˆL which maximizes the likelihood ratio L(z), with zˆL ≤ z¯. If the mode of the ratio is
located at the upper bound, that is, zˆL = z¯, we arrive at a monotone order as a special
case.
Definition 3 The two distributions F , G satisfy the Monotone Likelihood Ratio (MLR)
order and we write F ÂMLR G, if the ratio of their densities L(z) is strictly increasing.
Milgrom (1981) introduced the MLR order to the economics of information. More
recently, Athey (2002) employs the MLR order to obtain monotone comparative statics
in games of incomplete information. As Milgrom (1981) points out, many well known
families of distributions - for example, the normal and the exponential - satisfy the
MLR order. A similar set of families of distributions satisfy ULR order. One can easily
verify that, for example, if F and G are both normal or both lognormal, with µX ≥ µY
and with F having strictly lower standard deviation then F ÂULR G.
4Note that the condition on the means rules out the possibility that the mode is at the lower bound
which would imply that Y first order dominates X.
5The ULR order implies second order stochastic dominance. Remember that if a random variable
X second order stochastically dominates random variable Y , any risk averse decision maker will prefer
X as, by second order stochastic dominance, either it oﬀers a higher return and/or it is less risky.
6For review of logconcave and logconvex functions see An (1998).
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zz z˜
1
z¯zˆ− zˆ+
F (z)
f(z) f(z)
g(z)
F (z)
G(z)
Figure 1: An Example where Distribution F ULR Dominates G
It is well-known that the MLR order implies first order stochastic dominance and
other refinements of first order stochastic dominance, such as the hazard rate order and
the reverse hazard rate order, see, for example, Krishna (2002, Appendix B). Similar
relationships can be shown for the ULR order. Define the probability ratio and the
survival ratio as respectively,
P (z) =
F (z)
G(z)
, Q(z) =
1− F (z)
1−G(z) . (1)
Proposition 2 [Metzger and Rüschendorf (1991, Theorems 2.3 and 2.3 (c))] If L(z)
is unimodal with maximum at zˆL then P (z) is unimodal with a maximum at zˆP ≥ zˆL
and Q(z) is unimodal with a maximum at zˆQ ≤ zˆL.
The ratio σ(z) = f(z)/F (z) is known as the “reverse hazard rate” in the statistics
literature (see, for example, Shaked and Shanthikumar (1994)). Note that if the proba-
bility ratio of two distributions is strictly increasing then the two reverse hazard ratios
are ordered, or
P 0(z) > (<)0⇒ σF (z) =
f(z)
F (z)
> (<)
g(z)
G(z)
= σG(z). (2)
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There is a similar relation between Q(z) and the hazard ratio, which for a distribution
function F (z) is defined as λ(z) = f(z)/(1−F (z)). That is, it is the ratio of the density
to the survival function, 1− F (z). Note that
Q0(z) > (<)0⇒ λF (z) =
f(z)
1− F (z) < (>)
g(z)
1−G(z) = λG(z). (3)
Therefore, combined with Proposition 2, these relations lead to the following corollary,
which will prove useful for comparative statics.
Corollary 1 Suppose F ÂULR G then (i) σF (z) > σG(z) almost everywhere on (z, zˆP ),
and σF (z) < σG(z) almost everywhere on (zˆP , z¯); (ii) λF (z) < λG(z) almost everywhere
on (z, zˆQ), and λF (z) > λG(z) almost everywhere on (zˆQ, z¯).
Corollary 2 Suppose F ÂMLR G then (i) P 0(z) > 0 almost everywhere on (z, z¯),
i.e. σF (z) > σG(z) almost everywhere on the entire interval; (i) Q0(z) > 0 almost
everywhere on (z, z¯), i.e. λF (z) < λG(z) almost everywhere on the entire interval.
3 The First Price Auction
We start with the standard (winner pays) first price auction with independent private
values. We compare auctions that take place under two diﬀerent distributions of val-
uations. We show (Proposition 4) that, when the distributions are ordered according
to the ULR order, bids are higher under the less dispersed distribution except perhaps
at high values. But this result also implies (Corollary 3) that when the distributions
are ordered according to the MLR order, which is a special case of the ULR order
and implies that the dominant distribution is first order stochastically higher, there is
uniformly higher bidding under the dominant distribution.
There are n ≥ 2 bidders each with a private value z independently drawn from a
common distribution F (z), which is twice diﬀerentiable with strictly positive density
on its support [z, z¯]. Each agent makes a bid x which can be any non-negative real
number. Strategies will therefore be of the form x(z), a mapping from value to action.
We go on to consider the eﬀects of changes in the distribution F (z) on the symmetric
equilibrium strategy.
If an agent with value z wins with bid x, she is awarded the object for sale and gains
a payoﬀ U(z−x), otherwise her payoﬀ is zero. Only the winner makes a payment to the
seller. We assume that U(·) is twice continuously diﬀerentiable with U 0 > 0 and U 00 ≤ 0
and that U(0) = 0. Suppose all agents adopt the same strictly increasing diﬀerentiable
strategy x(z), then the expected utility V of an agent of type z who bids x(zˆ), that is,
as if she had type zˆ will be
V (x(zˆ), z, z−i) = Fn−1(zˆ)U(z − x(zˆ)) (4)
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Diﬀerentiating with respect to zˆ, and setting zˆ to z we have the following first order
conditions
−U 0(z − x)F n−1(z)x0(z) + (n− 1)f(z)F n−2(z)U(z − x) = 0 (5)
Rearranging, we obtain the following diﬀerential equation
x0(z) = (n− 1) f(z)
F (z)
U(z − x)
U 0(z − x) = (n− 1)σ(z)ψ(x, z), (6)
where σ(z) is the reverse hazard rate function and ψ(x, z) = U(z − x)/U 0(z − x).
Solution to this diﬀerential equation together with corresponding boundary condition
will constitute symmetric equilibria for the auction.
Proposition 3 [Maskin and Riley (2000b, 2003)] The unique solution to the diﬀeren-
tial equation (6), with initial conditions x(z) = z represents a symmetric equilibrium
for the first price auction that is unique on (z, z¯].
It turns out that the boundary conditions are important for comparative statics.
Here, the lowest-value player bids right the way up to her value.7 As we will see later,
the equilibrium behaviour of the lowest type is much more aggressive in the first price
auction than in all pay auction. Moreover, low value bidders in the first price auction
will respond to more competitive environments by bidding more, while in the all pay
they will bid less.
Specifically, we examine the eﬀect of a more competitive distribution of types in the
sense of the ULR order, introduced in the previous section, on equilibrium strategies.
Remember that the ULR order implies that the dominant distribution is either higher or
less dispersed than the dominated. We show that, given a distribution F that is higher
in the ULR order than another distribution G, there will be more aggressive bidding
by most types under the distribution F . Specifically, the bidding function under the
higher distribution xF (z) will cross the other bidding function xG(z) at most once, and
if this crossing does take place, it must do so at a high value.
Proposition 4 Suppose there are two distributions F,G such that we have F (z) ÂULR
G(z). Let xF (z) and xG(z) be the corresponding solutions to the diﬀerential equation
(6). Then, in the first price auction, xF (z) > xG(z) on (z, zˆP ) where zˆP is the maximum
on [z, z¯] of the probability ratio P (z) = F (z)/G(z). Further, if zˆP < z¯, then xF (z) can
cross xG(z) once and from above on (zˆP , z¯).
7Actually, a more precise boundary condition for the first price auction is that limz↓z x(z) = z.
Strictly speaking, the bidder of type z is indiﬀerent between all bids on the interval [0, z] (thus our
claim that the equilibrium specified is unique only on (z, z¯]). The boundary condition x(z) = z is used
for reasons of simplicity.
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Proof: First, by Proposition 2, as F (z) ÂULR G(z) the probability ratio P (z) =
F (z)/G(z) is unimodal and, thus has a unique maximum which we label zˆP . Now,
by Corollary 1, we have σF (z) = f(z)/F (z) > g(z)/G(z) = σG(z) almost everywhere
on (z, zˆP ). Let us first show that if xF (z) and xG(z) do cross on (z, zˆP ), then xF (z)
crosses xG(z) from below. This easy to see from the equation (6), as it implies that at
any point z× such that xF (z×) = xG(z×), we have that
x0F (z×)
x0G(z×)
=
σF (z×)
σG(z×)
(7)
That is, as σF (z×) > σG(z×) for any z× ∈ (z, zˆP ) we have x0F (z×) > x0G(z×). This
implies that there is at most a single crossing of xF (z) and xG(z) on (z, zˆP ).
Consequently, there are three possible cases. First, xF (z) > xG(z) on (z, zˆP ). Sec-
ond, xF (z) < xG(z) on (z, zˆP ). Third, xF (z) < xG(z) on (z, z1) for z1 < zˆP where
z1 is the unique crossing point of the two solutions. Note that the second and third
possibilities both imply that xF (z) < xG(z) on (z, z + ) for some  > 0. In this case,
as xF (z) < xG(z) and, given our assumptions on the utility function U , it is easy to
establish that ψ is decreasing in x, so that ψ(xF (z), z) > ψ(xG(z), z) on (z, z+ ). Note
that also σF (z) > σG(z) on (z, zˆP ). Together this implies that x0F (z) < x
0
G(z) for all
z < z+ , which given xF (z) = xG(z), implies that xF (z) > xG(z) on (z, z+ ), which is
a contradiction. Thus, if σF (z) > σG(z) on (z, zˆP ), only the first case is possible, that
is, xF (z) > xG(z) on (z, zˆP ).
Now, F (z) ÂULR G(z) implies that σF (z) < σG(z) on (zˆP , z¯). Examining equation
(7), it is clear that there is at most one crossing of xF (z) and xG(z) on (zˆP , z¯) and xF (z)
must cross xG(z) from above - if at all.
Some intuition behind the failure of monotonicity disclosed in Proposition 4 can be
explained in the following way. As the distribution of types becomes more compressed,
the marginal return to raising one’s bid rises as it becomes easier to surpass rivals whose
values are now more closely packed, inducing more aggressive bidding. Specifically,
in the first price auction, the eﬀect of the distribution of valuations enters through
the reverse hazard ratio f(z)/F (z). Under Corollary 1, we know that f(z)/F (z) >
g(z)/G(z) for z < zˆP . That is, as long as P (z) (as depicted in Figure 2) is rising, then
incentives are higher under the less dispersed distribution F . However, for z > zˆP , the
inequality is reversed. This is possible because in a less dispersed distribution, there are
fewer high values, thus the density f(z) may be quite low for high values of z (see, for
example, Figure 1) and so f(z)/F (z) can be lower than g(z)/G(z). Thus, the bidding
functions may cross for some z above zˆP . We now give an example of where the bidding
functions do not cross, and one where they do.
Example 1 Consider a n-bidder first price private value auction. Let F (z) be 3z2−2z3
and G(z) = z both on [0, 1] and both having expected values of 1/2. Then, as G is
a uniform distribution and F has a unimodal density (similar to Figure 1), we have
F ÂULR G. If there are two risk-neutral bidders, the equilibrium bidding functions are
8
zP (z) = F (z)G(z)
z
P (z)
z
0
1
z¯zˆL zˆPz˜ z∗
x∗
P (z)
x(z)
xF (z)
xG(z)
Figure 2: Comparative Statics for a First Price Auction
xF (z) = z(3z − 4)/(4z − 6) and xG(z) = z/2 for n = 2. These do not cross on (0, 1),
but they meet at the boundaries. However, for three risk neutral bidders, or equivalently
if n = 2 but U(·) =p(·), the solutions are xF (z) = 2z(126−175z+60z2)/(35(3−2z)2)
and xG(z) = 2z/3. These cross much as in Figure 2. Note that zˆP , the maximum of
P (z) = F (z)/G(z), is equal to 0.75 and the solutions cross at approximately 0.93.
If the maximum of the likelihood ratio is at the upper bound, i.e. zˆL = z¯, then the
ratio is monotone and by Proposition 2 the maximum of the probability ratio P (z),
the point zˆP , will be at the upper bound z¯. Since Proposition 4 establishes that any
crossing must take place to the right of zˆP , it follows that the solutions will not cross.
That is, a stochastically higher distribution of values, in the sense of the MLR order,
leads to uniformly higher bidding.
Corollary 3 Suppose xF (z) and xG(z) are the equilibrium bidding functions for distri-
butions F (z) and G(z), respectively. If F (z) ÂMLR G(z), then xF (z) > xG(z) almost
everywhere.
This result is well known and is a special case of the results of Lebrun (1998) and
Maskin and Riley (2001a) and Athey (2002). We reproduce it here solely as a contrast
to the corresponding result for all pay auctions, given as Corollary 4 below.
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4 The All Pay Auction
We have just seen that in first price auctions a stochastically higher distribution of
values implies a strong competitive response. Specifically, under the MLR order, in the
standard first price auction, bidding is higher almost everywhere under the stochastically
higher distribution. As we will see in this section, the response to more competitive
environments in the all pay auctions is markedly diﬀerent from that in the first price
auction. Specifically, low value bidders will respond to a distribution of values that is
stochastically higher and/or more compressed by bidding less.
Again, we consider an auction with n ≥ 2 bidders, each with a private value z
independently drawn from a common twice diﬀerentiable distribution F (z), with strictly
positive density on its support [z, z¯]. If an agent with value z wins with bid x, she gains
the object for sale and her payoﬀ is U(z − x). Importantly, we now assume that if she
loses her payoﬀ is U(−x). That is, all bidders must pay their bid, whether they win
or lose. Again, we assume that U(·) is twice continuously diﬀerentiable with U 0 > 0
and U 00 ≤ 0 and that U(0) = 0. Suppose all agents adopt the same strictly increasing
diﬀerentiable strategy x(z), then the expected utility of an agent of type z who bids
x(zˆ), that is, as if she had type zˆ will be
V (x(zˆ), z, z−i) = F
n−1(zˆ)U(z − x(zˆ)) +
¡
1− F n−1(zˆ)
¢
U(−x(zˆ)) (8)
Diﬀerentiating with respect to zˆ, and setting zˆ to z we have the following first order
conditions
−x0(z)(U 0(z−x)Fn−1(z)+U 0(−x)(1−F n−1(z)))+(n−1)f(z)Fn−2(z)(U(z−x)−U(−x)) = 0
(9)
Rearranging, we obtain the following diﬀerential equation
x0(z) = (n− 1)f(z)Fn−2(z) U(z − x)− U(−x)
U 0(z − x)F n−1(z) + U 0(−x)(1− Fn−1(z))
= h(z)γ(F (z), z, x) (10)
where h(z) = (n − 1)f(z)Fn−2(z) is a density of the order statistic Fn−1(z) for the
highest of n− 1 draws and γ(·) abbreviates the quotient term in the above equation. A
solution to this diﬀerential equation together with corresponding boundary condition
will constitute symmetric equilibria for the auction.
Proposition 5 [Amann and Leninger (1996)] The unique solution to the diﬀerential
equation (10), with initial conditions x(z) = 0 represents a symmetric equilibrium for
the all pay auction that is unique on (z, z¯].
Notice that the boundary condition in the all pay auction is quite diﬀerent from
the one in the first price auction. In particular, the lowest-value bidder in the all pay
auction bids nothing, while in the first price auction she pays everything. That is, the
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equilibrium behaviour of the lowest type is much less aggressive in the all pay auction.
Similarly, low value bidders in the all pay auction will respond to a more competitive
environment by bidding even less. More precisely, we show that the bidding function
under the lower distribution xG(z) is higher for low values but the two distribution
functions must cross over. Finally, just as for the first price auction, under a less
dispersed distribution there can be lower bidding at high values of z.
Proposition 6 Suppose there are two distributions of values F (z) and G(z) with the
same support [z, z¯] such that F (z) ÂULR G(z) and let xF (z) and xG(z) be the cor-
responding equilibrium bidding functions for the all pay auction given by (10). First,
xF (z) < xG(z) on (z, zˆ−] where zˆ− is the first crossing point of f(z) and g(z). Second,
xF (z) and xG(z) cross at least once on (zˆ−, z˜) where z˜ is the crossing of F (z) and G(z).
Third, either xF (z) > xg(z) on [z˜, zˆ+], where zˆ+ is the second crossing point of f(z)
and g(z) or xF (z) > xg(z) on [z˜, z¯] if there is no such second crossing of f(z) and g(z).
Last, however, xF (z) and xG(z) may cross again on (zˆ+, z¯] if zˆ+ exists.
Proof: First, the ULR order implies that F (z) < G(z) on (z, z˜). Then, from the
unimodality of the ratio f(z)/g(z) it must be that f(z) < g(z) on some interval (z, zˆ−)
with necessarily zˆ− < z˜ (see, for example, Figure 1). Then, if F (z) does not (first
order) stochastically dominate G(z) there will be a second crossing of f(z) and g(z),
denoted zˆ+ on the interval (z˜, z¯) (again see Figure 1). This implies that hF (z) < hG(z)
on (z, zˆ−) (where both f(z) < g(z) and F (z) < G(z)), while hF (z) > hG(z) on (z˜, zˆ+)
(where, instead, both f(z) > g(z) and F (z) > G(z)).
Then, note from the diﬀerential equation (10) that ∂γ(F, z, x)/∂F > 0 if U 00 < 0 and
is zero if U 00 = 0. So, for any point of crossing in the interval (z, zˆ−), we have x0F (z) <
x0G(z). So there can be only one such crossing. So either xG(z) > xF (z) as claimed or
xF (z) > xG(z) on an interval (z, z˘) for some z˘ > z. But then as ∂γ(F, z, x)/∂x < 0
and ∂γ(F, z, x)/∂F ≥ 0, it would follow that x0F (z) < x0G(z) on (z, z˘). Given xF (z) =
xG(z) = 0, we have a contradiction. So it must be that xG(z) > xF (z) on (z, zˆ−).
Second, suppose now that xG(z) > xF (z) on all of (z, z˜), that is, there is no crossing.
In equilibrium, a bidder facing distribution F (z) with value z expects utility VF (z) =
F (z)n−1U(z− x(z)) + (1−F (z)n−1)U(−x(z)). Now, by the envelope theorem, we have
V 0F (z) = U
0(z − x(z))Fn−1(z). Thus since F (z) < G(z) on (z, z˜) and xF (z) < xG(z) we
have V 0F (z) < V
0
G(z) so VF (z˜) < VG(z˜). But as
VF (z˜) = F n−1(z˜)U(z˜ − xF (z˜)) + (1− Fn−1(z˜))U(−xF (z˜))
we have VF (z˜) ≥ VG(z˜) as F (z˜) = G(z˜) and xF (z˜) ≤ xG(z˜). So, we have a contradiction
and, thus in fact, xF (z) and xG(z) must cross at least once on (zˆ−, z˜).8
Third, on the interval (z˜, zˆ+), we have both f(z) > g(z) and F (z) > G(z) and thus
hF (z) > hG(z). Thus, at any point of crossing of xF (z) and xG(z) on the interval, it
8Under the stronger assumption of risk neutrality, there will be exactly one crossing of xF (z) and
xG(z) on the interval [z, z˜].
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must be that x0F (z) > x
0
F (z), so in fact, there can be no crossing. Finally, on the interval
[zˆ+, z¯), crossing of xF (z) and xG(z) is possible where hF (z) < hG(z).
The above result is that low value bidders will bid less under the higher and/or more
compressed distribution F (z), but that the bidding function must cross over between
zˆ− and the point where the two distribution functions cross z˜ (see Figure 3). The
proposition also identifies the possibility of a further crossing that, if it exists, must
take place to the right of zˆ+. Such a crossing is illustrated in Figure 3. A specific
example of these comparative statics is the following.
Example 2 Consider a n-bidder all pay private value auction. As in Example 1, let
F (z) be 3z2 − 2z3 and G(z) = z both on [0, 1]. The density functions for these distri-
butions cross at zˆ− = 0.211 and zˆ+ = 0.789. If there are two risk-neutral bidders, the
bidding functions are xF (z) = (4 − 3z)z3/2 and xG(z) = z2/2. These are equal at 0,
1/3 and 1. That is, there is only one crossing and as per Proposition 6 it is to the right
of zˆ−. However, if there are three risk-neutral bidders then the bidding functions are
xF (z) = 2z5(126 − 175z + 60z2)/35 and xG(z) = 2z3/3. These are equal at 0, 0.438
and 0.979 so there are two crossings as in Figure 3, with the second to the right of zˆ+
as predicted. That is, both low value and high value bidders bid less under distribution
F (z).
Again the case where F (z) ÂMLR G(z) is a special case of the above result, where
there is no second crossing of f(z) and g(z) and so zˆ+ does not exist. Then, we have no
crossing at high values and high value bidders bid more under the higher distribution.
However, this does not aﬀect the result about crossing at low values. So, it is the case
that even when the distribution F (z) is very strongly stochastically higher than G(z),
the higher distribution induces lower bids from those with low values. Note the contrast
with the corresponding result for first price auctions, Corollary 3, where all types bid
more.
Corollary 4 Suppose xF (z) and xG(z) are the equilibrium bidding functions for distrib-
utions F (z) and G(z), respectively. If F (z) ÂMLR G(z), then xF (z) < xG(z) on (z, zˆ−],
where zˆ− is now the unique crossing point of f(z) and g(z), but xF (z) and xG(z) cross
so that xF (z¯) > xG(z¯).
The mathematics behind this diﬀerence in behaviour for bidders with low values in
first price and all pay auctions can be seen by comparing the first order conditions for
the two formats. For simplicity, we assume risk neutrality and the first order condition
for the first price auction (5) becomes
−Fn−1(z)x0(z) + h(z)(z − x) = 0 (11)
and the equivalent for the all pay (9) is
−x0(z) + h(z)z = 0. (12)
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Figure 3: Comparative Statics for an All Pay Auction.
In both cases, the first term gives the marginal cost and the second the marginal benefit
of raising one’s bid. The marginal benefit in both cases depends on the density h(z) =
(n − 1)f(z)Fn−2(z) which gives the marginal probability of winning. This density is
lower for low values under distribution F (z) than under G(z) (for example, on the
interval (z, zˆ−) in Figure 1, it holds that both f(z) < g(z) and F (z) < G(z)), giving
low value bidders in the all pay auction a clearly lower incentive to compete. Simply
put, under the higher distribution low values are less likely, so that a bidder with a low
value is unlikely to overtake any other bidders by raising her own bid.
However, in the first price auction, the marginal cost of raising one’s bid (the first
term in (11)) is also lower in the stochastically higher distribution as the marginal cost
of a bid here depends on the probability of winning Fn−1(z), which is lower under F
than under G for z < z˜. After all, in the first price auction, one only pays if one wins.
Thus the change would seem to have an ambiguous eﬀect. But if one takes the first
order conditions (11) and divides by Fn−1, one obtains −x0(z)+(n−1)σ(z)(z−x) = 0.
That is, the two eﬀects can be combined into the reverse hazard ratio σ(z) and we know
from the results of Section 2 that this ratio will be higher on (z, zˆP ) given the ULR
order, or everywhere given the MLR order. Thus, in the first price auction, low value
bidders respond to a higher or less dispersed distribution by bidding more (Proposition
4).
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Finally, similar considerations apply to the type of contests analysed by Moldavanu
and Sela (2001) that are closely related to all pay auctions. The main diﬀerence is that
rather than having diﬀerent values for the object for sale, competitors who diﬀer in the
cost of production compete for prizes that have a common value. Here we look at the
simple case where n agents compete for a single prize with fixed common valueW . The
prize is awarded to the agent with the highest output. Each agent pays a cost cx to
produce output x. Let c = 1− z, where z is the agent’s type which is an independent
draw from F (z) with support [z, z¯] with z¯ < 1. Thus, an agent choosing x(zˆ) when all
others adopt the strictly increasing strategy x(z) will obtain an expected utility
V (x(zˆ), z, z−i) = F
n−1(zˆ)U(W − (1− z)x(zˆ)) + (1− Fn−1(zˆ))U(−(1− z)x(zˆ)).
A symmetric equilibrium in increasing strategies will therefore be a solution to the
diﬀerential equation
x0(z) = h(z)
(U(W − (1− z)x)− U(−(1− z)x))
(1− z) (F n−1(z)U 0(W − (1− z)x) + (1− F n−1(z))U 0(−(1− z)x)) =
= h(z)ξ(F (z), z, x) (13)
where ξ(·) abbreviates the quotient component of the equation. Again we have the all
pay boundary condition of x(z) = 0. Notice that the signs of the partial derivatives of
the function ξ(·) in (13) are the same of the function γ(·) in (10), and thus it is easy
to establish a result similar to that of Proposition 6, where low types will respond to a
more competitive environment by bidding less.
5 An Example from Price Competition in Oligopoly
There are similar considerations for procurement auctions and oligopoly games. That
is, there are plausible models of oligopoly where a reduction in costs leads some sellers
to charge higher prices.
Suppose n firms each have constant marginal cost c but the exact level of that cost
is private information. Each is an independent draw from a distribution F (c) with a
continuous positive density on [c, c¯]. The firms compete on price in a simultaneous move
game. We assume there is a finite maximum price p¯ that consumers are willing to pay.
The standard model of price competition is of course the Betrand model. As Bertrand
competition is formally similar to a procurement auction (as noted by Spulber (1995)),
it easy to show that, under the MLR order, it would generate monotone comparative
statics.
However, we consider another example, as given by Bagwell and Wolinsky (2002)
who consider an incomplete information version of the Varian (1980) model of price
dispersion. There are n ≥ 2 firms that compete on price to sell to N consumers. Each
consumer seeks to buy one unit of the good, if the price does not exceed a common
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reservation price p¯. A proportion q of consumers are uninformed and purchase from a
randomly chosen seller. The other 1 − q only buy from the lowest priced firm. In the
version of Bagwell and Wolinsky, each firm has private information about its marginal
cost c, which is an independent draw from the distribution F (c) which has support
[c, c¯]. Expected profits for a firm with costs c from charging a price p(cˆ) when the other
sellers use the symmetric strategy p(c) are thus
V (p(cˆ), c, c−i) =
N
n
(p(cˆ)− c)
¡
q + n(1− q)(1− F (cˆ))n−1
¢
.
This gives rise to the diﬀerential equation
p0(c) = (p− c)
µ
(n− 1)f(c)(1− F (c))n−2
A+ (1− F (c))n−1
¶
, p(c¯) = p¯. (14)
where A = qn(1−q) . The boundary condition is that highest-cost player chooses the
highest possible price. In all pay auctions the weakest type bids zero and never wins,
here she names the reservation price and never sells to the informed customers.
To explore the eﬀect of general increase in costs on firms’ pricing behavior, let us
define the ratio
Θ(c) =
A+ (1− F (c))n−1
A+ (1−G(c))n−1 (15)
We first show that the monotone likelihood ratio order implies the unimodality of Θ(c).
Lemma 1 If F (c) ÂMLR G(c), then Θ(c) has a unique maximum at some cˆ ∈ (c, c¯).
Proof: Define RF (c) = (1 − F (c))n−1 and RG(c) = (1 − G(c))n−1 and use ri(c) =
R0i(c), i = F,G. Note that Θ(c) = Θ(c¯) = 1 and that as F stochastically dominates G,
we have F (c) ≤ G(c) and Θ(c) ≥ 1 for c ∈ (c, c¯). It is easily checked that at any point
where Θ0(c) = 0, then Θ(c) = rF (c)/rG(c). Note that since
rF (c)
rG(c)
=
f(c)
g(c)
µ
1− F (c)
1−G(c)
¶n−2
= L(c)Q(c)n−2
the ratio rF (c)/rG(c) is strictly increasing on (c, c¯) if both L(c) =
f(c)
g(c) and Q(c) =
1−F (c)
1−G(c)
are increasing on that interval. According to Corollary 2, these last two conditions are
satisfied if F (c) ÂMLR G(c). Finally, since rF (c)/rG(c) is increasing there can be only
one turning point for Θ(c), that is, Θ(c) is unimodal with a unique maximum at some
cˆ.
We now employ unimodality of Θ(c) to show that in this oligopoly model, just like
in the all pay auction, the MLR order is not suﬃcient for a uniform increase in prices.
Proposition 7 Suppose pF (c) and pG(c) are the equilibrium pricing functions arising
from the diﬀerential equation (14) for distributions F (c) and G(c), respectively. If
F (c) ÂMLR G(c), then there exist a point c× such that pF (c) > pG(c) on [c, c×) and
pF (c) < pG(c) on (c×, c¯) and c× < cˆ where cˆ is the maximum of Θ(c).
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Proof: Again, define RF (c) = (1−F (c))n−1 and RG(c) = (1−G(c))n−1 and use ri(c) =
R0i(c), i = F,G. Furthermore, for i = F,G define θi(c) =
−ri(c)
Ri(c)+A
, so that p0i(c) =
(pi − c)θi(c).
According to the above Lemma, if F (z) ÂMLR G(z) then Θ(c) is unimodal with
a unique maximum at some cˆ. It is easy to notice that θF (c) < (>)θG(c) whenever
Θ0(c) > (<)0. Thus, if pF (c) and pG(c) cross, then at the point of crossing c× it must
be that p0F (c×) < p
0
G(c×) (i.e. pF cross from above) if c× < cˆ, and p
0
F (c×) > p
0
G(c×) (i.e.
pF cross from below) if c× > cˆ. Thus, there could be only one (if any) possible crossing
per interval.
Now, since θF (c) > θG(c) on (cˆ, c¯), then clearly p0F (c) > p
0
G(c) on that interval.
This, together with the boundary condition pF (c¯) = pG(c¯), implies that pF (c) < pG(c)
on (c˜, c¯) for some c˜ > cˆ. Furthermore, one can rule out a possibility of pF (c) > pG(c) on
(cˆ, c˜) since that would imply that pF would cross pG from above, which is a contradiction
to the above conditions on the points of crossing. Thus, pF (c) < pG(c) on (cˆ, c¯).
We will now show that there is a unique crossing of pF (c) and pG(c) on (c, cˆ). Suppose
to the contrary, that there is no crossing of pF (c) and pG(c) on (c, cˆ). But that would
imply that pF (c) ≤ pG(c). Note that in equilibrium, for i = F,G, a seller of cost c
expects Vi(c) = (p− c)(q+ n(1− q)Ri(c)). Thus, if there is no crossing, we would have
VF (c) = (pF (c) − c)(q + n(1 − q)) ≤ (pG(c) − c)(q + n(1 − q)) = VG(c). To show that
this cannot happen, note that, by the envelope theorem, V 0i (c) = −n(1− q)(A+Ri(c)).
MLR order implies that F (c) < G(c) on (c, c¯), and thus RF (c) > RG(c) on the entire
interval. This, in turn, implies that V 0F (c) < V
0
G(c) on (c, c¯). Thus, given that VF (c¯) =
VG(c¯) = (p¯− c¯)q, it must be that VF (c) > VG(c), a contradiction.
Note that here F (c) ÂMLR G(c) implies that G(c) involves costs being generally
lower. We would expect a decrease in costs to make the market uniformly more com-
petitive. However, here a stochastically lower distribution of costs G(c) induces the
high cost firms (firms with costs greater than cˆ) to charge higher prices. Only low cost
firms respond with lower prices. The reason for this is the presence of the uninformed
consumers, who ensure that all firms have a minimum demand of qN/n, and make this
game less competitive than standard Bertrand. With a lower distribution of costs, a
firm at any given level of costs will be less likely to win the competition to name the
lowest price and attract the informed consumers. If one’s costs are high, the chances of
winning can be so low, that it may be better to give up the chase. Compare this with
Bertrand competition (or equivalently this model with q = 0). There, charging a high
price ensures only zero profits. The relative lack of competitiveness for high cost firms
in the Varian model enables them to respond in a relaxed way to greater competition.
16
6 Conclusions
In this paper, we investigate two new types of comparative statics in first price and
all pay auctions, both of which give rise to non-monotone results. First, we show that
in all pay auctions even a stochastically higher distribution of types does not lead to
uniformly more aggressive play. We find similar results for an oligopoly game with
incomplete information: a stochastically lower distribution of costs will lead to higher
prices being charged by some sellers. Second, we show that refinements of second
order stochastic dominance are suitable for comparative statics, but are not in general
suﬃcient for monotonicity.
In this paper, we surveyed some stochastic orderings used to rank distributions in
terms of dispersion. We also applied them to comparative statics analysis. We hope
that they will find further similar applications. First, there has been a recent interest in
the eﬀect of changes in inequality in the degree of social competition (Samuelson (2004);
Hopkins and Kornienko (2004); Hoppe, Moldovanu and Sela (2005)). Second, we do
not investigate asymmetric auctions in this paper. However, the orderings in terms of
dispersion used here could also be useful, for example, in determining the eﬀects of one
player having more precise information than other bidders. This further application of
stochastic orders will be the subject of future research.
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